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ABSTRACT
For decades, the prevailing sentiment among economists was that growth rates remain
constant over the long run. Kaldor considered this to be one of the six important "stylized facts"
that theory should address, and until the emergence of endogenous growth models, this was a
fundamental feature of growth theory.
This paper uses an endogenous trend break model to investigate the unit root hypothesis
for 16 countries, using annual ODP data spanning up to 130 years. Rejection of the unit root,
which is facilitated by the inclusion of a trend break, introduces the possibility of examining the
long run behavior of growth rates.
We find that most countries exhibited fairly steady growth for a period lasting several
decades. The termination of this period was usually characterized by a significant, and sudden,
drop in GD!' levels. But rather than simply returning to their previous steady state path, as
predicted by the standard neoclassical growth model, most countries continued to grow at roughly
double their prebreak rates for many decades, even alter theft original growth path had been
surpassed.
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Oneof the fundamental "stylized facts" that characterized postwar growth literature is
that output grows "at a steady trend rate", both in aggregate and per worker ternis (Kaldor,
1961).This featureisone of theprominent characteristics of the Solow (1956) neoclassical
growth model. Three decades later, the endogenousgrowthliterature, starting with Romer
(1986),has shown that growth rates need not be constant and they may actually increase over
time.
Empirical research on this issue has not provided a clear choice between the endogenous
and neoclassical growth models. Romer (1986 and 1989) provides evidence that growth rates
have been rising over time. Using data from Maddison (1982), he shows that rates of growth
for countries that were productivity leaders have risen since 1700. In an analysis of the United
States, Romer (1986) calculates 40 year annual averages and finds increases in the rates of
growth between 1840 and 1978.Abraxnovitz (1989), however, uses moving average
computations to smooth business fluctuations and concludes that U.S.aggregateand per capita
growth rates exhibited a slowdown between 1870 and 1953. In contrast, Romer (1986), using
one observation per decade, rejects the hypothesis that there is a non-positive trend 4n the growth
rate over successive decades for eight of eleven countries. He then shows how, within a fully
specified equilibrium, per capita output may grow without bound at rates that can be increasing
over time.
The analysis here differs from the Romer and Abramovitz studies in that it does not use
broad averages based on arbitrary period lengths to determine the long run behavior of growth2
rates. Recent breakthroughs in time series analysis enable an endogenous determination of trend
breaks within the framework of unit root tests. Rejection of the unit root nullpermits the
calculationof steady state growth rates.
Our empirical work builds upon much previous research which examines whether real
GNP (or GDP) can be characterized by a unit root. Following Nelson and Plosser's (1982)
failure to reject the unit root null for either aggregate or per capita U.S.GNP,Perron (1989),
with the break date determined exogenously, and Zivot and Andrews (1992), with an endogenous
break choice, find that the unit root hypothesis can be rejected if a one-time break is
incorporated in the deterministic trend. While the above studies focus on the U.S.,Raj(1992)
and Perron (1993) use endogenous trend break tests and extend the unit root analysis to
additional countries.'
Inthispaper, we utilize up to 130 years of annual aggregate and per capita (JDP data for
16countriesto investigate whether economicgrowthisconstantor changing over time. For
nearlyeveryone ofthecountries, the trend break which provides thestrongestevidence against
theunitroot nullis associatedwith a sharp declineinGD?:World WarIIfor mostcountries,
World War Ior theGreat Depression for the rest.
This study provides empirical evidence that while countries do tend to exhibit relatively
constant growth rates for extended periods of time, the occurrence of a major shock to the
economy appears to result in a drop in levels followed by sustained growth that exceeds the
earlier steady state growth. In 20 of the 32 cases examined (16 aggregate and 16per capita),
countries exhibit significant steady state behavior, growing at constant rates until a major
'Neither Raj (1992) norPerron (1993) considersissues of economic growth. In the unit root context, this paper
extends their work byexaminingmore countries over a longer time span.3
upheaval occurs. Posthrealc growthof aggregateGDP for stationary countries was twice the
prebreak growth. In the case of per capita GD!', postbrealc growth rates were, on avenge, two
and a half time the prebreak rates.2
The finding that posthreak exceed prebreak growth rates is not sufficient to distinguish
between the neoclassical and endogenousgrowth models. White bothfnmeworks would predict
this outcome during the transition phase back to the steady state path, the neoclassical model also
predicts that, once the steady state is reached, growth rates should return to their prebreak steady
state values. Our results show that the faster growth usually continues even after the countries
reach, and eventually surpass, their previous steady state paths, with the new, post-transition,
rates of growth greatly exceeding the old steady state rates.
This result suggests a possible bridge between the Romer-type increasing growth
predictions and the Olson (1982) explanation that major social upheavals can cause a breakup
of coalitions whose long-term existence may have lead to a petrification of resource allocations
within an economy. The ensuing removal of these rigidities can lead to a more efficient
allocation of resources and hence, to faster subsequent growth. We find the existence of a
significant relationship between the magnitude of the decline in GDP levels and the subsequent
increase in ppst-transition period growth rates over prebreak steady state rates.'
The paper is organized as follows. Sequential Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots are
summarized and empirical results are presented in Section II. Implications of these results for
3Growthbehavior in the non-significant cases did not appear lobe appreciably different.
'Ourfindingof increased growth rates r.ises the possibility, discussed by Rocua (1986), that they are continuously
changing. We investigate the possibility of higher order noastatioaarity by testingfor unit rootsin GDP growth
rates. Using Augmented-Dickey-Fuller tests (without breaks), the unit root null can be rejected at the 1 percent
level for both aggregate and per capita real GDP growth for all 16 countries.4
issuesinvolvingeconomic growthare considered in Section III. Conclusions are presented in
Section IV.
IL TREND BREAKS AND UNIT ROOTS
Thequestion of whether macroeconomic variables, in particular real GNP, can be
characterized by unit roots has been the subject of considerable investigation.4 Nelson and
Plosser(1982), in a widely cited study using long-term annualdatafor theUnited States, showed
that the null hypothesis ofa unitroot couldnot berejectedfor most macroeconomicvariables.5
These results have not gone unchallenged. Perron (1989)argues that only two events,
the Great Crash of 1929 and the oil price shock of 1973, have had apermanent effect on
macroeconomic variables. Using the same data as Nelson and Plosser, he shows that,allowing
a single change in either the intercept of the trend function after 1929 or the slope of the trend
function after 1973, most macroeconomic variables, includingaggregate and per capita GNP,
are trend stationary.6
Perron's results have also not gone unchallenged. In Perron (1989), the date of the break
is treated as known. Christiaao (1992)argues that the date of the break should be treated as
unknown a priori.Heuses bootstrap methods to compute appropriate critical values, and shows
CampbellandPerron (1991) provide extensivereferences.
Theexception wastheunemployment rate.
•
Rappoport and Rejeblin(t939) also develop unit root tests with trend breaks.5
thatthereis littleevidence in favor of the hypothesis that postwar U.S. real GNP is stationary
arounda broken trend againsttheunit rootnull.7
This study usesanendogenous trendbreak model toinvestigate the unit roothypothesis
for bothaggregateand percapita(iDe.Twoissues,bothemphasizedby Campbelland Perron
(1991), guide our choices of data and tests. First, the power of unit root tests is largest when
the span of the data is longest. Second, lengthening the span of the data increases the possibility
ofamajor structural change.We utilize a much longertime span (130and120yearsfor most
of theaggregate andpercapitadata,respectively)and includemorecountries (sixteen) than is
common in unitrootstudies.
ThesequentialDickey-Fuller tests of ZivotandAndrews(1992) axerun ondatacompiled
byMaddison (1991).'Heprovides annual (IDP data for16countries,mostlystarting in1860
foraggregate and 1870 for percapita dataandendingin 1989. Indexesof annual aggregate real
CIDP(adjusted to exclude the impact of boundary changes) were converted into 1985 U.S.
relativeprices using OECD purchasing power parityunitsof nationalcurrencyperU.S. dollar.
Annual per capita GDPs 'werecalculatedby dividing the aggregate GDPs by the mid-year
7Baneijee. Lucusdaine, and Stock (1992) use a variety of tests based on asymptotic distribution theory, which also
treat the break date as unknown a priori, to investigate these questions. Using postwar GNP for the 0-7 countries,
they can only reject the unit root null in favor of the trend shift hypothesis for Japan. Zivot and Andrews (1992).
using & sequential Dickey-Fuller test on both long-nan and postwar Nelson-Plosser data, find less evidence against
the unit root hypothesis than was found by Penon (1989).
'These tests are univariate. Sal, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1991) develop nualtivarinte tests for dating breaks, but do
not test for unit roots.6
populationlevels.9 While the annual aggregate data begins in 1860 for most countries, the per
capita GDPislimitedbythe population data which begins in 1870.
It should be pointed out thatdataforthe war years tends to beconsiderablyless accurate
than fortheremaining years.Thus, one shouldnotattach toomuch importance to a break that
occurs during one war year rather than another. The emphasis here wilt be on the fact that the
break is related to a war rather than to a precise year.
These concerns are particularly important in the case of Germany, which underwent
several wars that coincided with substantial population and territorial changes over the past
century. Maddison (1991) makes an important contribution in trying to correct for these
changes, but nonetheless, a note of caution is warranted regarding the accuracy of the German
results.
To provide a benchmark for our later results, we compute Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) tests which do not incorporate breaks (the results appear in the Appendix). For 15 of
the 16 countries, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10percent level for
either aggregate or per capita real GDP. These findings support Nelson and Plosser's (1982)
inability to reject the unit root null, despite our utilization otmuch longer spans of data.
Surprisingly, the lone exception is the United States (which was tho basis of the Nelson and
TheMaddison data were modified forconsistency purposes. For example, the regions of Alsaceand Lorraine
were nc ud in the French total and deducted from the 6ev-an total population count. The U.K. figures were
adjusted so as not to include Irish 61W or population. Also, the Italian population statistic for 1870 was augmented
by Rom&s population so as to accord with the subsequent Italian population data. Thesechanges were relatively nunoranddidnotaffect the ADF regressions in any meaningful way.7
Plosser study),where the null can be rejected at the 5, but not the1,patent level for both
variables.
A plausible reason for the failure of our ADE tests to reject the unit root null is
misspeciftcation of the detenninistic components included as regressors.'° With long spans of
data, it becomes more likely that the series of interest is characterized by a major stnscturai
change. Failure to account for such a structural change biases the test in favor of the unit root
h)pothesis.
Augmented-Dickey-Fuller tests which incorporate breaks involve regressions of the
following form,
(1) 4y1 =p+ODU+Pt+yDT+ + cJ4yfrJ+c(.
Theperiod at which the change in the parameters of the trend function occurs will be referred
to as the timeofbreak,or T5.The break dummy variables have the following values:
DL', =1if : > T1, 0 otherwise, and D7 =tif : > T8, 0 otherwise." Following
ZivotandAndrews(1992),models are estimated for 1' =2,...,T-1,where Tis the number of
observationsafteradjusting for those 1osr by first-differencing and lag length k.
For each choice of'8, thevalue of k is selected by thecriteriaadvocated byCampbell
and Perron(1991), whichis described in the Appendix. The time of break for each series is
selected by choosingthevalueof 1'5for which the Dickey-Fulleri-statisticis maximized. The
ISThe sensitivityofunit root tests to specification of trends undedying postwar U.S.ONPis investigated by
Ehargava(1990).
Zivot and Andrews defineDr, = z-T,. This makes no difference for the Dickey-FulIert-statistic but we
choose Dt =: to facilitatethegrowthanalysis inthe next section.8
null hypothesis,thatthe series {yJ is an integratedprocess without an exogenousstructural
break, is tested against the alternative hypothesis that {yj is trend stationary with a one-time
breakinthetrend function which occurs at an unknown time)2 -
FollowingPerron's nomenclature, there arethree possible models under thealternative
hypothesis.Model A, the'crash" model,allowsfor achange in the interceptofthe trend
function (this will be referredtoas a level change), DLI, but not in the slope. ModelB,the
'changing growth' model, allows for a changeinthe slope of the trendfunction (to bereferred
to as a trendchange),DT, but not in the intercept. Model C allows for bothlevelandtrend
changes. We firstestimate regressions forModelC underthealternative.Ifthe i-statistics on
DLIandDTareboth significantforthe chosenTB,,we report theresultsfor ModelC. If either
(-statistic isinsignificant,wedrop the associated variable and estimate either Model A or B.'3
Ourmajorresultsare summarizedin TableI andthefull set of coefficientsand
associated i-statisticsarepresentedin Table A2 (panelsAandB).For the vast majorityof
countries,both theintercept andslope trend break dummy variables are significant,making
Model C the appropriate model.ModelA is estimatedforSwitzerland andModel Bfor
Germany)4 For theUnitedStates, Model A is estimatedforaggregaterealGDP but Model
C is estimated for percapita real GDP.This differs from bothPerron(1989) andZivotand
1 OUT specification is identical to Zivot and Andrews(1992). Perron (1989, 1993) takes the time of break to be
exogenous under the null, which requires estimating an additional dummy variable DIP,1 if t + 1. 0
otherwise. We estimated our models with this additional variable. The results were essentially unchanged, except
that, as to Perron (1993), most of the break dates were one year earlier.
3 There were no cases where both g-cthtstrwere insignificant for Model C. When Models A or B were
estimated, the 1-statistics for DU and Dr. respectively, were always significant. Since the choice among models
does not depend on the Dickey-Fullet- i-statistic, this selection procedure will not affect the critical values.
"Following PerioD (1993),weestimate Model B as a two-step procedure and the coefficients for Gennany in Table
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Andrews (1992),neitherof which allows for a change in the slope of the trend function and thus
estimates Model A by assumption.'3
The dates of the breaks accord closely with intuition. The countries which exhibit
significant breaks during the Second World War; Japan, Norway, and the continental European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland), are those which were most affected by the War." Breaks occur during the First
World War for the United Kingdom (where the trauma of the War was followed by the loss of
Ireland and the outhreak of an extremely deadly and widespread flu epidemic), Finland (which
achieved independence from Russia), and Sweden.
'The countries that were most removed physically and suffered the least damage during
both World Wars; Australia, Canada, and the United States, exhibit breaks between 1925 and
1929. The results of Zivot and Andrews (1992) concerning real GNP for the United States
continue to hold with our longer span of data. We find the time of break to be 1929 for both
aggregate and per capita real GD?, exactly what was assumed by Perron and found by Zivot and
Andrews, This result, based on a span of data about twice as long as the Nelson-Plosser data,
provides further evidence for the Great Crash as the cause of the U.S. break.'7
"We also ran sequentialADFtestsonthe long-term GNP data analyzed in Backus and Kehoc (1992),which we
thankDavid Backus for providing. For the six countries; Australia, Canada, Italy, S den; the United Kingdom,
and the United States, for which the Backus-Keboe data did not containgaps, the choice of models, selection of
break dates, and significance levels of Dickey-Fuller i-statistics was similar to the Maddison data.
Norway was invaded by (ennany in 1940.
" It is interesting tocompare our results for the United States with those of Zivot awl Audrews (1992). For
aggregate real GDP, we choose Model A with lag length k=I and rejeci the unit root null at the I percent level.
These results accord exactly with those of Zivot and Mdrews. For — capita real CDI', we choose Model C with
lag length Jr = 8, while Zivot and Andrews assume Model A. We reject the unit root null for per capita GD? at
the I percent level while Zivot and Andrews can only reject it a! the 10percent level. Thus, using a longer span
of data, we find as much evidence against the unit root hypothesis foraggregate, and considerably more for per
capita, real GDP than was found by Zlvot and Andrews.10
TheGreat Crash, however, did not causethebreak for anyothercountry.Forthe vast
majority ofcountries,13out of 16, the breakswerecausedbywars. Even for Australia and
Canada, where the breaks were associated with the onset of the Great Depression, they occur
before 1929. The Dickey-Fuller i-statistics associated with all possible break years are plotted
for per capita real GDPin Figure 1for Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States)5 The break year was the same for both aggregate and per capita GDP for 11 of the
16countries.
The central result of this section is that allowing for breaks produces considerable
evidence against the unit root hypothesis for both aggregate and per capita real GDP. We can
reject the unit root null at the 1 percent level in 16 out of 32 cases, 8 each for aggregate and per
capita. This contrasts with the failure of conventional ADFtests,which do not allow for breaks,
to reject the unit root null at the 1 percent level in any of the 32 cases. At the 10 percent level,
where conventional ADF tests reject the null in only 2 of the 32 cases, we reject the null in 20
cases, 9 for aggregate and 11 for per capita real GDP.
"These countrieswelt selected to illustrate therange of models and break yeats that we find, and ale not intended
to be repiesentative. Similar plotsfor theothercountries. as well asforaggiegate data, are available from the
authors.Figure 1
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YEARifi. TREND BREAKSANDSTEADY STATE GROWTH
Issuesinvolving economic growth are of great importance to both macroeconomic theory
and policy. In this section, we show that countries which exhibit trend stationarity willconverge
to a steady state growth path. We then develop the implications of trend breaks by comparing
prebreak and postbreak steady state growth rates.
Suppose that k = 0 (i.e. no lagged differences). Then the standard Dickey-Fuller type
first-order difference equation with drift and trend is
(2) Ay,
=p + fit + ay,1







The annual rate of growth, y, (where as before, y, denotes the log of real GD?) is
= A(1+a)ta—A
If y(:) is trend stationary, so that -I C a < 0, the growth rate asymptotically approaches the
'steady state" constant value
(3)
1112
From Equation 2, if y(t) is not trend stationary, so that a =0,growth rates will increase
withoutbound, i.e.
lim4y=co t-o.
Thegeneralform of Equation 2, which allows for k lagged differences is
4= •IJt+1),





y =p+fit+ + + #
where
#1=1÷a+c1,vfr1,—e11—c,and —C1
As in thesimpleDickey-Fuller solution(Equation 3) the rate of growth in the general case
asymptoticaJly approaches the constant vaiu&'
limay,=p/(1_E#p=:l
"This result was venfied using numerical simulations.13
Thus, rejection of the unit root null implies that growth rates will stabilize around a
constant value that is not dependent on k or the c's.2° This value, -fl/a, will be referred to as
the steady state rate of growth.
Row then, does the existence of a break in the trend function affect steady state growth?
A level change (i.e. a change in the intercept of Equation 1) affects income levels, but it has no
effect on the growth rates. On the other hand, a trend change (i.e. a change in the slope, or
trend, coefficient) in the presence of stationarity will have an impact on the country's steady
state growth path.
Steady state growth rates were calculated for each country using the estimated coefficients
from Table A2 for the trend ( /1) and lagged GDP ( d ). The postbreak growth rates also
incorporate the increment to fi given by f , the coefficient for the trend dummy variable, DT.
Thesesteady state rates appear in Table 2. The results should be treated with caution in the
cases of countries for which the null of a unit root could not be rejected (the stationary countries
are marked with an asterisk).Thecountries are grouped according to their time of break.
The postbreak rates of growth clearly exceed the prebreak rates. With aggregate GOP,
the average steady-state postbreak rate for the nine stationary countries was nearly double the
prebreak rate. For all 16 countries, the postbreak rate was 78 percent above the prebreak rate.
With per capita GDP, the average steady state posthreak rate was nearly two and a half times
the prebreak growth rate for both the 11 stationary and for all 16 countries.
The differences were largest for those countries which experienced trend breaks during
World War II, with the average ratio of postwar to prewar growth rates equal to 2.06 for
Z Theintuition behind this is that, in augmenSDickey-Fullertests, the rejection or non-rejection of the taut root
hypothesis dependsonly onthe value of a,noton the c's.Table 2 Prebreak and Postbreak Steady State Rates of Growth
AGGREGATE PER CAPITA—
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Siaionaiy countries denoted by -14
aggregateand 2.70 for per capita GDP. The average ratios of postbreak to prebreak growth
were also greater than unityfor the World WarIandGreat Depression trend break countries.
As withtheWorld War H countries, theincreasein steady state growth was greater for per
capita than for aggregate GDP.
TheresultsinTable 2 appear toconfirm the Romer predictions. Of the sixteen countries
analyzed hereover a 120 yeartimespan, allbutonedisplayed higher postbreak per capita
growth,with steady stategrowthratiosexceedingunity.2' Not one countryexhibited any
evidenceof moving to a new pathwith slowergrowth(i.e. asub-unity growthratio).
While15 of the 16 countriesexperiencedfaster per capitaincomegrowthfollowingthe
breakintrend, in 14 of thesecountries theheightenedgrowth followeda significant dropin
incomelevels.The question is, how related are these two events? Of the three groups, the
WWII countriesexhibited thehighest steadystate growth after their breaks, while the mean drop
in their postbreak income levels was2½-3timesaslarge, on average, asthat experienced by
theother two groups (Table 2). Can the higher postbreak growth be a reflection of the
immensity of the negative shock experienced b the countries?
Onepossibility isthatit takes manyyearsto return tothe stable path and the faster
growthsimply reflectstransitionback to the previous steady state pathratherthan to a new,
higher steady stategrowth path. This possibility is examined below. Alternatively,thismight
beevidence ofMancurOlson's (1982) notionthatmajorupheavalstendto lead to a breakupof
old"distributional" coalitions.Oncethe major coalitionslosepower,they can no longer impede
The loneexception beingSwitz.eñand which cxpesienced * positivelevelchange atthe teniiinatioa of the Second
WorldWar.15
amoreefficient redistributionof resources. If that is the case, then one would expect faster
growth to follow the majorreorganizationsthat occurred during the periods in question.
Therelationship between the mean drop in incomes and the subsequent increase in growth
rates over the prebreak steady state rates may be estimated by regressing
(6) DROG1 =ir2+•"A +
where DROG,isthe relative increase ingrowthrates fromtheir prebreakpathsto theirpostbreak
paths and O isthecalculated drop in incomefor countryi (both vectors are drawn fromthe
Equation1estimates bycountry, so an income reduction is represented by a negative 6,
Theresults, which appearinTable 3,reflect a significantrelationshipbetween themagnitude
of the level changes induced by the breakand the changesin the growthrates whichfollowed.
Muchof the increase in growth rates (over the prebreak growth) can be attributed to the fall in
incomes that followed the breaks.22
Whileit is clear that postbreak growth exceeded the prebreak steady state rates, there
remains a question of whether these results are simply driven by the rebound of the countries
during their respective transition periods. In other words, these findings may be simply a
reflection, of the neoclassical growth model's prediction that growth should be faster during the
transition back to the steady state path. What happens when the transition periods are omitted
from the postbreak results? Do GDP levels and growth rates return to their prebreak paths?
Though thelevelchangesaccount forapproximately one half of the growth increases,it is clear that these may
notbe the only possible explanation for the higher postbreak growth. Germany is one example where no level
changes were found to be significant though the country exhibited increases in trend. Though the country's Income
clearly fell at the termination of the Second World War, its rebound was so fast and so thorough that the data do
not indicate any lasting level effects from the Wat The country did however expeñeace an increase in its steady
stategrowth rates (by23 percent for aggregate GDP and 47 percent for per capita GDP).Whilepoor prewar data
may be the source of some of these apparent changes, there are probably other factors causing the growth increase.
ATable 3 RelationshipBetween
Pre- and Postbreak Growth Rates
and Level Changes

















The length of each country's transition period was found by extrapolating the prebreak
steady state growth path of each country from the year prior to the break. The end of the
transition period is determined when the actual levels of GD? eventually equaled that of the
fitted levels, i.e. when the country returned to its prebreak path. This left the post-transition
yearswhich could then be compared to the prebreak years.
A graphical depiction of this exercise appearsin Figure 2. For completeness,theper
capita GDPgraphs for every oneof the 16 countries is provided in this figure. In 13 of the 16
countries, there is a noticeable transition period followed by visual evidence that the post-
transition behavior of GD? was clearly different from that of the prebreak years. In each of
these countries, post-transition growth exceeded prebreak growth by a substantial margin. Of
the three remaining countries, the United States and Canada exhibited results that conformed
very closely to the neoclassical predictions of a return to the steady state path, both in terms of
growth rates as well as levels. The third country, Switzerland was an outlier model A country
that experienced a positive level change in its break year, 1944.
The visual evidence is corroborated by a comparison of the calculated average annual
growth rates in Table 4. For those countries with transition periods, the actual growth rates
exceeded the fitted steady states rates from the post-transition period by 78 percent for aggregate
and 131 percent for per capita GD?. An estimation of Equation 6 with the post-transition
growth rojios (of actual to fitted average growth rates) on the left-hand side indicates a
significant relationship between the increase in growth rates and the magnitude of the drop in
GDP levels (Table 5).
Thus the Olson explanation that big shocks are required as a precursor to heightened
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atendency to increase over time, then one might expect a linearization of such a process (caused
by the presence of Olson-type rigidities). Following a period of major upheaval, these rigidities
are removed and the economy can reap the benefits of a more efficient reallocation of resources.
lv.CONCLUSIONS
Thefindings of this study show that each of the 16 OECD countries analyzed exhibited
a significant trend break over the past one and a quarter century. Once the endogenously
determined trend breaks are accounted for, the unit root null, which could not be rejected
otherwise (with the exception of the United States), can be rejected for the majority of these
countries.
Trend stationarity is necessary for convergence to a steady state growth path. The
determination of significanttrendbreaks enables the calculation of asymptotic growth rates for
each subperiod. These "steady state" rates are markedly higher following the breaks. This is
still true after omitting the period of transition back to the prebreak steady state path. This
evidence that steady state growth rates appear to be growing over extended periods of time is
in contradiction with the predictions of the neoclassical growth model as well as With ICaldor's
(1961) stylized fact that growth rates remain steady over time. However, increasing growth is
compatible with Romer-type endogenous growth models. Furthermore, increases in the growth
rates also appear to be significantly related to the decreases in income leveti that coincided with18
the breaks. The combination of these two findingsallows us toreconcile Romer's and Olson's
theories about economic growth.APPENDIX: AUGMENTEDDICKEY-FULLERTESTS
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test involves regressing the first-difference of a variable
ona constant,trend, its lagged level, and kfirst-differences,
p +t + ay+
tCJ4Y:J
+
where y isthelogarithm of real GD?. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if a, the
coefficienton the laggedlevel of output, is significantly different from zero. While the
asymptotic distribution of the i-statistic for a is non-normal, critical values have been calculated
by, among many others, MacKinnon (1991). The absolute value of the (-statistic for a is often
cafle4 the Dickey-Fuller s-statistic.
We follow the procedure suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) to select the value
of k.Startwith an upper bound on k chosen a priori.Ifthe last included lag is significant,
choose the upper bound. If not, reducek by one until the last lag becomes significant. If no
lags are significant, set k = 0. Following Perron (1989) and Ziivot and Andrews (1992), we set
thç upper bound on k to equal 8 and the criterion for significance of the s-statistic on the last lag
equal to 1.60!
The results of the ADF tests are reported in able Al. For 15 of the 16 countries, the
null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level for either aggregate or
per capita real GD?. The exception is the United States, where the null can be rejected at the
5, but not the I, percent level for both variables. Since Nelson and Plosser (1982), using annual
While alternatives to our selection csiteria exist, we followtheidentical procedwe used by Perron md Zivot and
Andrews to ensure that, if our results differ from theirs, the differences cannot be caused by the choice of lag kiigth
selection cntena.
AlTable Al Dickey-Fuller t-Statist)cs
RealGDP(through 1989)





























































































Sipiifiaot cc the 5%level.A2
data for 1909-1970,cannotreject the unit root null for either aggregate or per capita real (3M!'
for the United States at the 10 percent level, this accords with the conjecture, expressed by
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990), that the failure to reject unit roots in real GM!'maybe
related to the short time span of available data?' Our results for the other 15 countries,
however, usingequallylong spans of data, do not support this conjecture. If the unit root null
cannot be rejected with 130 years of annual data, it does not appear likely that searching for
additional data will make much difference.
'Thepower ofunitroot tests, as discussed byCampbellmdPerron(1991), depends on the span of thedata rather
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J-Uati.ta 3a parentheses Alldatacad iii 1989.
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